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ON PLANTINGA'S WAY OUT
Dale Eric Brant

The foreknowledge problem involves two assumptions. First, that "God
once believed that an event would occur now" is about the past. Second
that it is equivalent to "God once existed and the event is occurring now."
These, Plantinga argues, are incompatible. But he (implicitly) makes
assumptions. First, that equivalent propositions are both about a given
time, or neither are. Second, that if a proposition is (is not) about a given
time, so is (neither is) its negation. Third, that if two propositions are (are
not) about a given time, so is (neither is) their conjunction. These, though
plausible, are incompatible.

In trod uction 1.2
Since Nelson Pike published his resuscitation of Boethius's problem with
the compatibility of divine foreknowledge and human freedom, most of
the historical answers to the problem have been suggested. 3 These
include that of Boethius himself/ that of Scotus,' that of Ockham6 and
that of Molina. 7 Each of these answers to the foreknowledge problem has
its proponents, but the prominent solution seems to be Ockham's. In a
nutshell, the foreknowledge problem begins by noticing that for any
proposition, God's past belief of that proposition implies its truth. But it
is too late now to do anything about God's past beliefs. God's past
beliefs are per accidens necessary. So it is already too late to do anything
about anything that that belief implies. If the object of belief is a proposition describing future human action, it is already too late to do anything
about that action. In an equally simplistic nutshell, Ockham's view is
that, because God's past belief about a future human action implies the
truth of a future contingent, the claim that God held that past belief
depends for its truth on the future conditions that will make that future
contingent true. Because it depends on future conditions, the claim that
God held that past belief is not per accidens necessary: even now, it's not
too late to do something about it. I intend to argue that there are some
fairly general reasons to think that at least one rather basic brand of
Ockhamism fails as a solution to the foreknowledge problem. Note that I
am not taking a stand here on the success or failure of the foreknowledge
problem or any of the other proposed solutions to it.
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Hard and Soft Facts
Pike's first respondent, John Turk Saunders,8 put forward something
like an Ockhamist attack on the foreknowledge problem. He claimed
that there is something odd about God's past beliefs, if they really do
imply their future contingent objects. This oddity leads one to wonder
whether God's belief is not like the proposition that Caesar was assassinated two-thousand and nine years before Saunders would write his
paper. The latter does indeed imply the (at the time of Saunders ruminations about Pike's paper) future contingent proposition that Saunders
would write. But it is not too late (or, at least, it wasn't in AD 1965) to
do something about that claim, even though it is about Caesar's assassination in 44 Be. This is because it depends on (and is also about)
Saunders's writing of his paper in AD 1965. Perhaps it is likewise not
too late to do something about God's past beliefs of future contingents.
In response to Saunders, Pike coined the phrase "hard facts" to refer to
conditions in the past that are completely over and done with.
Propositions express hard facts, when they are strictly about the past.
Soft facts are facts that are not hard. Propositions express soft facts
when they are not strictly about the past. Pike grants that it is now too
late to do something about hard facts and only hard facts about the past.
But since Pike numbers God's (or anyone's) past beliefs among the hard
facts about the past (while numbering the fact that Saunders would
write 2009 years after Caesar's assassination among the soft facts), the
impact of the foreknowledge problem remains undiminished.
One may restate the Ockhamist line in terms of the hard-facti soft-fact
distinction by saying that because God's past belief of some future contingent depends on (i.e. implies) the truth of its future contingent object,
that belief and any like it is a soft fact. Saunders, for example, would
have said that his writing of his paper in AD 1965 is as much a part of
the fact that God held a belief in 44 BC that Saunders would write as it is
a part of the fact that Saunders would write 2009 years after Caesar was
assassinated. In addition to Saunders, for whom Ockhamism was not all
that central, such important thinkers as Marilyn Adams and Alvin
Plantinga (the latter of whose account of Ockhamism will figure prominently in this paper) and a host of others have endorsed Ockhamism as
the solution to the foreknowledge problem, classifying God's past beliefs
of future contingents as soft, rather than hard, facts about the past.
I do think that there are problems with the host of individual efforts at
Ockhamist solutions alluded to above. But as problematic as I find them, in
this paper I shall only attack the view held by Plantinga. This is not that
great a limitation, however, since Plantinga's account depends only on a pair
of very minimal assumptions which he thinks (rightly in my opinion) are at
the core of Ockhamist intuitions about the distinction between hard facts and
soft facts. I shall identify another pair of assumptions also at the core of these
Ockhamist intuitions (and if anything, buried deeper in that core than
Plantinga's assumptions) and show that this core is (surprisingly) inconsistent. Before doing that, however, I would like to present the foreknowledge
problem in a manner that will facilitate the rest of my discussion.
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The Foreknowledge Problem in Detail

Let us consider a specific argument for theological incompatibilism in
the case of an agent, X, an act, A, and a future time period, t'. Suppose
that X will do A during t' and that there was a past time period, t, during which God believed that X would do A during t'. Then the argument proceeds as follows:
(1) "God believed during t that X would do A during t'" is true,

and X cannot do anything during t' to render it false.
(2) "God existed during t and X will do A during t'" implies that
X will do A during t'.
(3) "God believed during t that X would do A during t'" and
"God existed during t and X will do A during t'" are equivalent. (By God's Essential Omniscience)
(4) "God believed during t that X would do A during t'" implies
that X will do A during t'. (By 2 and 3)
(5) X will do A during t', and X cannot do anything during t' to render false the proposition that X will do A during t', i.e. X could
not have done otherwise. (By 1 and 4)
This form of the incompatibilist argument is not the simplest form of
the argument possible. Ordinarily, the incompatibilist would just take
(4) as the basic deterministic premise and argue from (1) and (4) to (5).
Premise 0) is supposed to be true because God's past beliefs (whatever
their objects) are past facts, so it is too late now to prevent such beliefs
from occurring. Ordinarily, the Ockhamist would attack premise 0) on
the grounds it is not too late to prevent God's past belief if the implication mentioned in premise (4) holds, since, if that implication holds,
God's past belief is a soft fact about the past. 9 But the form as given
lends itself to my discussion by allowing me to consider and criticize
that extremely minimal, but intuitively appealing, form of Ockhamism
offered by Plantinga.
As I suggested in the previous paragraph, if premise (1) in the argument above holds, it holds because t, the time during which God held
His belief, is in the past relative to t', the time during which X will do A.
Thus an underlying assumption of the argument above is the following:

The Principle of the Fixity of the Past (provisional)
No one can do anything during a present or future time period to
render false a truth about a past time period.
It is easy to misconstrue this principle as a special case of the truism
that, because truth and falsity are incompatible, one cannot render a
truth false, i.e. that one cannot render a proposition false while having it
remain true. Indeed some arguments for this principle, such as the one
given by Thomas, misconstrue it in just that way.!O But "one cannot render a truth false" is ambiguous (and uncontroversially true only under
one of its interpretations). As already noted, no one has the power to
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render any proposition false while having it remain true: were that
power exercised, some proposition would be both true and false. But
someone might have the power to render some proposition false, and
that proposition might happen to be true: were that power exercised, the
proposition would not be true; it is partly because this power is not exercised that the proposition is true.
Now, if the principle of the fixity of the past were nothing more than
an expression of the first interpretation of "one cannot render a truth
false," it would have nothing special to say about human power over the
past, since truth and falsity are incompatible no matter what time it is.
Instead, the principle of the fixity of the past says that, while someone
may sometimes have an (unexercised) power to render some propositions false even though they happen to be true, no one has such a power
over propositions which are about the past. The passage of time makes
it impossible to affect the truth-value of some truths which might have,
at one time, been such that it was possible to affect their truth-values.
In any event, this principle as it is instantiated in premise (1) is what
provides the necessity to the antecedent of the implication mentioned in
premise (4). Since this antecedent is necessary (with respect to human
capacity), and the implication itself is a logical implication, it follows
that the consequent, Le. the proposition that X will do A during t', is necessary (again with respect to human capacity). So even though the fixity
of the past, by itself, is compatible with one's having the power to render false truths about the present or future, when you add that God's
past beliefs imply every truth about the present or future (so that one
would have to render false a truth about God's past belief in order to
render false a truth about the present or future), the only conclusion you
can draw is that one does not have even an unexercised power to render
false truths about the present or future.

Ockhamism in Detail
The Ockhamist's first insight is noticing that some propositions about
past time periods are strictly about the past-such as the proposition
that Admiral Nelson was killed at Trafalgar in AD 1805. Some are notsuch as the proposition that Nelson was killed over 190 years before I
would submit this paper. In general, one may speak of propositions that
are strictly about a given time period. For propositions about the past,
the time period in question is just the set of past moments, but when
speaking of the times that propositions are about, there is no reason to
limit our attention to the past time period only. The second proposition
about Nelson's death, for example, is strictly about the time period from
AD 1805 to AD 1998, though not strictly about the past. In general, if a
proposition, P, is about only (but not necessarily all and only) moments
that occur during a time period, t, then P is strictly about t. One consequence of this is that if P is strictly about t, and t' completely overlaps t,
then P is also strictly about t'. The first proposition about Nelson's death
at Trafalgar is strictly about several (infinitely many in fact) time periods: the past, the 1800's, 1805 and 21 October 1805 to name four.
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The first insight also means that
for the time period t, we can define
two sets of propositions, At and Bt .
At contains all and only those
propositions that are strictly about
t, and Bt contains all and only
those propositions that are not
strictly about t. The very description of the two sets guarantees that
their intersection is empty, that
their union is the set of all proposiThe Partition of Logical Space
tions, and that (unless t is empty or
t is the set of all moments) neither
At nor Bt is empty.
The Ockhamist's second insight is noticing that the principle of the
fixity of the past is not plausible for propositions that are not strictly
about the past: one might be able to do something to render false a
proposition that, though about the past, is not strictly about the past.
This is because one might render the whole proposition false in virtue of
just those elements of it that are not about past moments. So:

I

I

The Principle of the Fixity of the Past
No one can do anything during a present or future time period to
render false a truth strictly about a past time period.
The Ockhamist's third insight is to note that "God existed during t and X
will do A during tIt, (a critical component of the foreknowledge problem as
presented above, see especially premises (2) and (3» is not strictly about the
past. Plantinga actually notes that "The time period, t, existed and X will do
A during tIt' is not strictly about the past, but the usefulness of this observation in attacking the foreknowledge problem along Ockhamist lines turns
out to depend on the equivalence of "The time period, t, existed and X will
do A during tIt' with "God believed at t that X would do A at t'." That equivalence ends up depending in tum on the necessary existence of God.
Plantinga could have gotten along without that assumption by simply making the observation I attribute to 'The Ockhamist' at the beginning of this
paragraph, since the conjunction "God existed during t and X will do A during t''' is also equivalent to "God believed during t that X would do A during
tIt, (as noted in premise (3) of my schematization of the foreknowledge problem). Either way, what seems to underlie this insight is the following:

The Mixed Conjunction Principle
The conjunction of one proposition strictly about a time period and
another not strictly about that time period is also not strictly about that
time period.
Plantinga adopts something like the mixed conjunction principle as an
intuitive constraint on our understanding of the distinction between propositions strictly about a time period and those not strictly about that time peri-
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od. He seems willing to allow the entire hard-facti soft-fact distinction to
turn on whether that principle is true. As I will indicate below, I think that
he is right about this: if there is a hard-fact I soft-fact distinction at all, something like the mixed conjunction principle must be true.
It may already be obvious, however, that for premise (1) of the incompatibilist
argument to be called into question it is "God believed during t that X would do
A during t'," not just "God existed during t and X will do A during t'," which
must fail to be strictly about the past. This is a bit difficult to credit. But now the
Ockhamist can bring forward a fourth insight on the distinction between propositions strictly about a time period and those not strictly about that time period. So:

The Equivalence Principle (provisional)
If two propositions are equivalent, then one of them is strictly about a
given time period only if the other is also strictly about that time period.

Plantinga expresses both the mixed conjunction principle and the equivalence principle in the following from his "On Ockham's Way Out" (the italics are mine, and the bracketed section represents a place where I replaced a
numerical tag with the sentence it tagged):
We may not be able to give a criterion for being strictly about the past,
but we do at least have a rough and intuitive grasp of this notion. Given
our rough and intuitive grasp of this notion, I think we can see two
things. First, no conjunctive proposition which contains [the proposition
that Paul will mow his lawn in 1999] as a conjunct is (now in 1986) strictly about the past.... And second, hard facthood is closed under logical
equivalence: any proposition equivalent (in the broadly logical sense) to a

proposition strictly about the past is itself strictly about the past."
While Plantinga explicitly states only the provisional equivalence principle
outlined above, let me take a second look at the division of the set of all propositions into the set of propositions strictly about t (At) and the set of propositions
not strictly about t (Bt) in the light of the provisional equivalence principle. This
principle says that if P is a member of At and Q is equivalent to P, then Q is a
member of At. Well if P is a member of Bt, and Q is equivalent to P, then Q had
better be a member of Bt also (for if Q
were a member of At, then by the provisional equivalence principle, P
would have to be a member of At also
and not Bt). So the equivalence principle should really go as follows:

The Equivalence Principle
If two propositions are equivalent,
then one of them is strictly about a
given time period just in case the
other is also strictly about that
time period.

The Equivalence Principle
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Now the equivalence and mixed conjunction principles work for the
Ockhamist as follows. Since "God believed during t that X would do A
during t'" and "God existed during t and X will do A during t'" are
equivalent, the equivalence principle forces a choice between both being
strictly about t on the one hand and neither being strictly about t on the
other. The mixed conjunction principle guarantees that "God existed
during t and X will do A during t'" is not strictly about t. So, "God
believed during t that X would do A during t'" must also fail to be strictly about t. Thus the principle of the fixity of the past no longer supports
premise (1) of the incompatibilist argument.
I must say that I think that Plantinga is dead right in this much: the
mixed conjunction principle and the equivalence principle are central to
the overall project of Ockhamism. I think that they serve as constraints
on the Ockhamist's understanding of the distinction between propositions strictly about a time period and those not strictly about that period.
If this is right, then, even though my attack is limited to Plantinga's
Ockhamism, if I can show that there is a conceptual problem for the
simultaneous truth of these principles (and other principles that lie at
the core of the Ockhamist's distinction between propositions strictly
about a given time period and those not strictly about that time period),
my criticism of Ockhamism will turn out to be quite general indeed.

Logical Difficulties for Ockhamism
Now, the fact that the equivalence principle is a closure principle
makes me wonder: Are there other plausible closure principles. I am
prepared to insist that there are two more. For the first one, let me note
that Plantinga actually committed himself to a bit more than the mixed
conjunction principle in the passage quoted above. Consider this
excerpt again:
(no conjunctive proposition which contains [the proposition that
Paul will mow his lawn in 1999] as a conjunct is (now in 1986)
strictly about the past.. ..
This actually says that the conjunction of a proposition not strictly about
the past (like the one about Paul and his lawn in 1999) and any proposition, be it strictly about the past or not, is not strictly about the past.
Thus a first stab at another closure principle is as follows:

The Pure Conjunction Principle (provisional)
The conjunction of two propositions not strictly about a given time
period is also not strictly about that time period.
This gives us the additional principle to which Plantinga is explicitly
committed. And I must say that it seems both obvious and central to the
Ockhamist's distinction between propositions that are, and propositions
that are not strictly about a given time period. If "Jane goes to the party
an hour before John" is not strictly about eight o'clock (John having gone
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then), and "Mary goes to the party two hours before John" is not strictly
about eight o'clock, it is hard to see how the conjunction of these two
could be strictly about eight o'clock. If there can be conjunctions strictly
about eight 0' clock, this conjunction had better not be among them.
But what about the conjunction of two propositions both of which are
strictly about a given time period. Well it seems obvious to me that the
conjunction is also strictly about the time period in question. If "Jane goes
to the party on Monday" and "Mary goes to the party on Monday" are
both about Monday, what could the proposition that they go together be
about? Tuesday? I must also say that this point seems, if anything, more
central to the Ockhamist's distinction between propositions that are, and
propositions that are not strictly about a given time period than any of the
closure principles that we have seen so far. So I think that Ockhamists,
like Plantinga, must augment the pure conjunction principle so:

The Pure Conjunction Principle
The conjunction of two propositions strictly about a given time
period is also strictly about that
time period, and the conjunction
of two propositions not strictly
about a given time period is also
not strictly about that time period.
I think that there is one more
closure principle that Ockhamists
should adopt as part of their core
of intuitions about the distinction
between those propositions strictly iThe Pure Conjunction Principlei
about a given time period and
those not strictly about that time
period. This has to do with the
negations of each type of proposition. So:

The Negation Principle
The negation of a proposition
strictly about a given time period is also strictly about that time
period, and the negation of a
proposition not strictly about a
given time period is also not
strictly about that time period.
This one also seems fairly obvious. If "Jane goes to the party on
Monday" is strictly about
Monday, just what time period
would "J ane does not go to the
party on Monday" be about?

,

r--

B
I

The Negation Principle
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Tuesday? I suppose that one might have this worry: that there are
ways that "Jane does not go to the party on Monday" could be true
and still fail to be about Monday, e.g. if time came to an end on
Sunday. Not so with "Jane goes to the party on Monday." If the latter proposition is true, then Monday exists, and it looks as though
that's the time that that proposition is about. So it looks as though
"Jane goes to the party on Monday" is strictly about Monday, but
"Jane does not go to the party on Monday" is not strictly about
Monday. But this objection misses the point of the negation principle. The negation principle merely says that if "Jane goes to the party
on Monday" is strictly about Monday, then its negation is also about
Monday. And it is worth noting that there is no more guarantee that
"Jane goes to the party on Monday" is strictly about Monday than
there is that its negation is strictly about Monday. Just as "Jane does
not go to the party on Monday" might be true and not about Monday
simply because Monday does not exist, "Jane goes to the party on
Monday" might be false and not about Monday for the same reason.
But, true or false, if "Jane goes to the party on Monday" is about
Monday, then so is its negation, and if it isn't, then neither is its negation.

The Contradiction Problem
Unfortunately, all these closure principles (equivalence, negation
and pure conjunction), which seem so obvious, cannot all be true. To
see this, begin by supposing that P is a member of the set of propositions strictly about t, i.e. of the set
I've been calling At, and that Q is
a member of the set of propositions not strictly about t, i.e. of
the set I've been calling Bt . This
supposition is safe because At
0~------'
and Bt are non-empty. By the
negation principle, -,P is also in
At and -,Q is in Bt . By the pure
conjunction principle, P J\-,P is
also in At and QJ\-,Q is in Bt .
Because P J\-,P and QJ\-,Q, like all
contradictions, are equivalent,
both must be in At and both in Bt .
The Contradiction Problem
But At and B t are, by their
descriptions, disjoint (i.e. their
intersection is empty), neither contradiction can be in both. So the
negation, the pure conjunction and the equivalence principles cannot
all be true. So Plantinga's minimalist approach to Ockhamism
appears to be in deep trouble.
There is a fairly obvious remedy to this problem. That is to somehow
adjust the key principles to respect the distinction between contingent
and non-contingent propositions. This suggests a division of logical
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space into four subsets rather than
two. These four subsets are the set
of the logical truths, which we may
call T, the set of logical falsehoods,
which we may call F, the set of
contingencies strictly about t,
which we may call At*, and the set
of contingencies not strictly about
t, which we may call B(. By their
descriptions, no pair of these sets
has any common member, but
New
every proposition is a member of
I The "Partition of Logical Space I
one of them (i.e. the four are pairwise disjoint and jointly exhaustive). T and F obviously have members, and, if t is neither empty nor the
set of all moments, At * and Bt * also have members.
Now the various closure principles require some adjustment.
Closure under equivalence is about as you'd expect. All four of the
sets are closed under equivalence. For T and F, this principle is obvious:
if a proposition is equivalent to a logical truth, it is a logical truth itself,
and if a proposition is equivalent to a logical falsehood, it is a logical
falsehood itself. And I take it that it was really At* and Bt* that
Plantinga took to be closed under equivalence. That is, if two contingent
propositions are equivalent, then if one of them is strictly about a time
period, then so is the other, and if one of them is not strictly about a time
period, then neither is the other. So:

The New Equivalence Principle
If a proposition is equivalent to
a logical truth, a logical falsehood, a contingency strictly
about a given time period or a
contingency not strictly about a
given time period, then that
proposition is, respectively,
also a logical truth, a logical
falsehood, a contingency strictly about the given time period
or a contingency not s trictly
about the given time period.

r------::-_N:..:,:ew
"':-_----===----=--_ _,-------,

The "Equivalence Principle
The appropriate moves on the
other closure principles also suggest themselves:
The propositions P and-,P are both contingent if one of them is, and
either both P and -,P are contingencies strictly about t, or neither P nor
-,P are contingencies strictly about t. My ruminations about Jane and
Mary's party-going habits above still apply perfectly here, since "Jane
goes to the party on Monday" and the rest are all contingent. That is to
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sa y that At * and Bt * are closed
under negation. But the negation
of a logical truth is a logical falsehood, and vice versa. So:

The New Negation Principle
,
The negation of a contingency
N
strictly about a given time periI
od is also a contingency strictly
about that time period; the
negation of a contingency not
strictly about a given time periNew
od is also a contingency not
The "Negation Principle
strictly about that time period,
and the negation of a non-contingency is also a non-contingency with the opposite truth value.
The pure conjunction principle can also be reworked to fit our new partition of logical space, again with some obvious exceptions. For the most
part, the conjunction of two contingencies strictly about t should still be
strictly about t itself. Again, see my dissertation on Jane, Mary and the
party. But a given pair of contingencies strictly about t might not be compatible. If so, then even if both are in A(, their conjunction belongs in F.
Similar reasoning will yield a similar exception to the closure of Bt * under
conjunction. However, the conjunction of two logical truths is a logical
truth, and the conjunction of two logical falsehoods is a logical falsehood.
So T and F are closed without
exception under conjunction. Thus:

The New Pure Conjunction Principle
Either the conjunction of two
contingencies strictly about a
given time period is also a contingency strictly about that
time period or it is a logical
falsehood; either the conjunction of two contingencies not
strictly about a given time period is also a contingency not
strictly about that time period,
or it is a logical falsehood, and
the conjunction of two noncontingencies with the same
truth-value is also a non-contingency with that truth-value.

New

IThe "Pure Conjunction Principle I

For good measure, note that a re-done mixed conjunction principle is also
possible:
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The New Mixed Conjunction Principle
Either the conjunction of two contingencies, one strictly about a
given time period and the other not strictly about that time period, is also a contingency not strictly about that time period, or it
is a logical falsehood. The conjunction of any given proposition
and a logical falsehood is a logical falsehood. The conjunction of
any given proposition and a logical truth is of the same kind as
the given proposition.
With this new mixed conjunction principle, "God exists during t and X
will do A during t'" still turns out not to be strictly about t, since the second conjunct, "X will do A during t'" is not strictly about t (whether
"God exists during t" is a contingency strictly about t or a logical truth).
As such, the new equivalence principle tells us that "God believed during
t that X would do A during t'" is also not strictly about t. So even though
t is in the past relative to t', the principle of the fixity of the past does not
support the first premise in the theological incompatibilist's argument.
That is, it does not show that God believed during t that X would do A
during t' and that X cannot do anything during t' to render false the
proposition that God believed during t that X would do A during e.

The Biconditional Problem
Unfortunately, these maneuvers do not solve the incompatibility
problem. One way of proving this would be to show that the new negation, new pure conjunction and new equivalence principles are inconsistent. I will take a different approach which is a bit shorter.
Let's turn for a moment to this rather ugly equivalence regarding the
relation between conjunction, negation and biconditionality:
"P=Q" is equivalent to "-,( -,(P /\Q)/\-,( -,P /\-,Q»"

The reason this equivalence is so important is that, together with the
new equivalence principle, the new negation principle and the new pure
conjunction principle it implies a closure principle for biconditionality.
By successive applications of the new negation and new pure conjunction principles, it would be possible to show that if P and Q are both of
the same kind, e.g. both strictly about the time period t, then (barring
one or more of the exceptions to those principles) -,(-,(1' /\Q)/\-,( -,1' /\-,Q»
is also of that kind. Since that proposition is equivalent to P=Q, if P and
Q are of the same kind, then by the equivalence principle P=Q must be
of the same kind as P and Q. It goes without saying that, given the
exceptions there were for the new negation principle and the new pure
conjunction principles, there are a lot of exceptions to the airtight closure
of T, F, At* and Bt under biconditionality. Indeed, it will turn out to be
simpler to think of the new 'closure' principle as simply saying that
biconditionals from At are excluded only from Bt* and vice versa. In
any event, here is the New Pure Biconditional Principle: 12
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The New Pure Biconditional Principle
No biconditional of two contingencies strictly about a given
time period is a contingency
not strictly about that time period; no biconditional of two contingencies not strictly about a
given time period is a contingency strictly about that time
period, and the biconditional of
two non-contingencies with the
same truth-value is a logical
truth.
New
One can see that there is a logical difficulty by supposing that P is IThe "Pure Biconditional Principle I
in the set of contingencies strictly
about t, i.e. the set I've been calling
At*, and that Q is in the set of contingencies not strictly about t, i.e. the
set I've been calling Bt *. Since
these two sets are non-empty
(given that the time period, t, is,
like the past, neither all nor none of
time), this assumption is safe. By
the new negation principle, -,P is in
At* and -,Q is in Bt *. Now one
asks the question: Where does P=Q
belong? The answer must be T, F,
At * or Bt *, since these four sets
together are exhaustive.
Where Does P=Q Belong?
If P=Q is in T, then P and Q are
equivalent. So since P is in At*, Q
is in At* by the new equivalence
principle. Since Q is in Bt*, Q is not in At*, because the two sets are disjoint. So if P=Q is in T, Q is and is not in A t *.
If P=Q is in F, then P and -,Q are equivalent. So since P is in At*, -,Q
is in At by the new equivalence principle. Since -,Q is in Bt, -,Q is not
in At*, because the two sets are disjoint. So if P=Q is in F, -,Q is and is
not in At.
If P=Q is in At*, then, since P is also in At, (P=Q)=P is not in Bt* by
the new pure biconditional principle. But (P=Q)=P is equivalent to Q,
and Q is in Bt *, so (P=Q)=P is in Bt * by the new equivalence principle.
So if P=Q is in At*, (P=Q)=P is and is not in Bt*.
If P=Q is in Bt, then, since Q is also in Bt*, (P=Q)=Q is not in At* by
the new pure biconditional principle. But (P=Q)=Q is equivalent to P,
and P is in At, so (P=Q)=Q is in At by the new equivalence principle.
So if P=Q is in Bt, (P=Q)=Q is and is not in At.
SO P=Q doesn't belong anywhere if the new equivalence, the new
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negation and the new pure conjunction (and, by these three, the new
pure biconditional) principles are all true. But this is impossible, so
those three principles can't all be true. Since these principles were at the
patched up core of Plantinga's Ockhamism, his Ockhamism still appears
to have some troubles.
An Ockhamist Line of Defense

A possible response from Plantinga would be to reject even the new
negation and new pure conjunction principles. He might argue that
there was a confusion very early on in my discussion of the contradiction problem regarding what time period a contradiction is (or is not)
strictly about. The old negation and pure conjunction principles indicate
that P!\-.P is strictly about a given time period just in case P is strictly
about that time period. The new negation and pure conjunction principles avoid this of course, by only making a commitment on contingent
compounds. Contradictions are identified as logically false without any
commitment on the time periods they are about. Similarly, tautologies
are identified as logically true without any commitment on the time
periods they are about.
Plantinga might continue as follows. The problem that the new negation and new pure conjunction principles solve is that tautologies and
contradictions are not about any time period, strictly or otherwise (I
frankly don't know how well this coheres with other views he may
have, so take the Plantinga I have in mind as an entirely hypothetical
Plantinga if need be). But these new closure principles only get at the
symptom without curing the real disease. The problem, in the case of
(P=Q)==Q for example, is that part of this proposition is in some way not
relevant to its truth or sense overall. There is really a contingent part of
(P=Q)=Q (i.e. P) and a non-contingent part, (maybe Q=Q?). This proposition is not about a time period in virtue of its non-contingent component. Thus a crucial step in the biconditional problem is avoided. To
wit, even though (P=Q) is not strictly about t, and Q is not strictly about t,
(P=Q)=Q is strictly about t (because P is strictly about t). To say otherwise would be to say that (P=Q)=Q is about moments other than those in
t only because of its non-contingent component (Q=Q?). But that component shouldn't be relevant to the time that the proposition is about.
The considerations of the previous paragraph could lead to an even
newer set of closure principles. Instead of these, however, I present the
following general principle that my hypothetical Plantinga would be
presupposing about what time periods compound propositions can be
about:
The Idle Complexity Principle

A proposition which is equivalent to a truth-functionally simpler
proposition cannot be about any moment in virtue of its additional
complexity.
I have two more things to say before concluding.
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More Problems
First, I don't find the rationale for modifying the old negation and
pure conjunction principles very appealing. My reasons for thinking so
have some bearing on the idle complexity principle. It seems to me that
tautologies have perfectly good truthmaking events or states-of-affairs
which exist at certain times. It further seems that tautologies (or any
truths for that matter) are strictly about various time periods in virtue of
the time periods at which their truthmakers exist. The proposition that
either Hannibal defeated Varro at Cannae in the August of 216 BC or
Hannibal did not defeat Varro at Cannae in the August of 216 BC has a
truthmaker, namely Hannibal's famous victory at Cannae in the August
of 216 Be. This truthmaker existed during the August of 216 BC, not
during any completely separate time period. This tautology about
Hannibal has a different truthmaker than, say, the proposition that
Millard Fillmore assumed the Presidency in the July of AD 1850 if and
only if Millard Fillmore assumed the Presidency in the July of AD 1850.
r presume that this second tautology'S truthmaker was Fillmore's taking
of the oath of office after the death of Zachary Taylor. Surely, the first
tautology is strictly about 216 BC and the second tautology is strictly
about AD 1850. Similar comments go for contradictions, their falsitymakers and the times they are about.
I believe that the concerns raised in the previous paragraph serve to
refute the idle complexity principle as well. More complex truths have,
it seems to me, more complex truthmakers which might exist during
time periods during which the truthmakers of equivalent simpler truths
might not exist. Thus more complex truths are, in general, about more
complex time periods. Similar remarks go for more complex falsehoods.
But for good measure, I also observe that, even if we grant the move
to the idle complexity principle, I'm not sure that my hypothetical
Plantinga hasn't been hoist on his own petard. After all, "God believed
during t that X would do A during tIt' is equivalent to "God existed during t and X will do A during t'." So by the idle complexity principle,
since the second of these two propositions is equivalent to a truth-functionally simpler proposition (the first of them) the second cannot be
about any moment in virtue of its additional complexity. Given the idle
complexity principle, why should one not say that God's belief existed
at t, and not at t' so that, if anything, both propositions are strictly about
t, not t and t'?
In brief, my hypothetical Plantinga's problem is that with the idle
complexity principle he's given us a reason to think that a proposition
might be about a shorter and less complex time period than its seems to be
about, but he's given us no reason to think that it might be about a longer
and more complex time period. But to make Ockhamism fly as a solution
to the foreknowledge problem, he must claim that the proposition that
God believed during t that X would do A during t' is about a longer and
more complex time period than it seems to be about (one including not
only t, but also t').
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Conclusion
If Plantinga wants to get Ockhamism out of trouble, I think he is
going to have to replace the equivalence principle with a more restrictive closure principle. To clarify this claim, I shall say that one two-place
relation, R, implies another, S, just in case for any pair of relata, X and Y,
"X stands in R to Y" implies "X stands in S to Y." When I say that
Plantinga is going to have to replace the equivalence principle with a
more restrictive closure principle, I mean that the new principle is going
to have to claim that the set of propositions strictly about t is closed
under some relation, R, and R must be a relation that implies but is not
implied by equivalence. This new, more restrictive, principle will thus be
implied by but not imply the equivalence principle.
Consider the relation of being-a-roundabout way-of-asserting. If
asserting P is a roundabout way of asserting Q, it follows that P and Q
are equivalent, but the converse is not true. So being-a-roundaboutway-of-asserting implies the equivalence relation, but not the converse.
I base the following principle on this relation:

The Reassertion Pril1ciple
If asserting one proposition is a roundabout way of asserting
another, then the one is strictly about a given time period just in
case the other is also.

Since the reassertion relation implies the equivalence relation (but not
the converse), the reassertion principle is more restrictive than the equivalence principle. The reassertion principle is implied by but does not
imply the equivalence principle. I think that the reassertion principle is
the best bet for replacing the equivalence principle. Because the reassertion principle does not imply the equivalence principle, this replacement
would leave Plantinga free to deny the equivalence principle, while
affirming the reassertion principle and the old negation and pure conjunction principles. Since contradictions are equivalent but need not be
reassertions of one another, Plantinga can handily avoid the contradiction problem (let alone the biconditional problem).
Note that this way of proceeding still leaves a Plantinga-style
Ockhamism available as a quite plausible answer to the logical fatalist.
The fatalist would give an argument similar in logical structure to the
one I gave above to express the foreknowledge problem:

tin is
true, and X cannot do anything during t' to render it
false.
(2) "The world existed during t and X will do A during t'''
implies that X will do A during t'.
(3) "It was true during t that X would do A during t'" and
"The world existed during t and X will do A during t'"
are equivalent.
(1) "It was true during t that X would do A during
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(4) lilt was true during t that X would do A during t'"
implies that X will do A during t'. (By 2 and 3)
(5) X will do A during t', and X cannot do anything during
t' to render false the proposition that X will do A during
t', i.e. X could not have done otherwise. (By 1 and 4)

Asserting that it was true during t that X would do A during t' (where
t is, as I've been assuming all along, earlier that t') really does seem to be
just a roundabout way of asserting that the world existed during t (so
that something could be true then) and that X will do A during t'. Thus,
even though "It was true during t that X would do A during t'" implies
that X will do A during t', there is nothing necessary about the
antecedent of this implication (at least, nothing necessary that comes
from the principle of the fixity of the past), since asserting it is just a
roundabout way of asserting a proposition not strictly about the past.
Unfortunately, I don't have a systematic way of showing that asserting one proposition is just a roundabout way of asserting another. I simply can't prove that "It was true during t that X would do A during t'"
and "The world existed during t, and X will do A during t'" really are
reassertions of each other, but doesn't it seem that way to you too?
What I think I can prove is that although the foreknowledge problem
does require that "God believed that X would do A during tIff and "God
existed at t and X will do A at t'" be equivalent, the foreknowledge problem itself does not require that they be reassertions of one another. As
such, theological incompatibilists can still offer a challenging argument
for their incompatibilism in a way that logical fatalists cannot.
It seems to me that there are four types of equivalence that are relevant here. The first type of equivalence is reassert ion (i.e. equivalence
based on no more than the effective identity of two assertions). As I've
already said, I am not sure when the reassertion relation holds, so I tend
to rely on intuition as my guide. The second type of equivalence is tautological equivalence (i.e. equivalence based on no more than propositionallogic). Tautological equivalence holds between any pair of propositions when they have exactly the same truth-table. The third type of
equivalence is de dicta equivalence (i.e. equivalence based on no more
than logic and the meaning of words). De dicta equivalence holds
between any pair of propositions when they are members of exactly the
same world-books (i.e. maximal consistent sets of propositions). The
fourth type of equivalence is de re equivalence (i.e. equivalence based on
no more than logic, the meaning of words and the essences of things).
De re equivalence holds between any pair of propositions when they are
true in exactly the same possible worlds.
It also seems to me that reassertion implies tautological equivalence,
which implies de dicta equivalence, which in turn implies de re equivalence. None of these implications go the other way. "P is true" is a
roundabout way of saying "it is correct to assert P," so asserting the one
proposition is effectively the same as asserting the other, the one has
exactly the same truth-table as the other, the one is in exactly the same
maximal consistent sets of propositions as the other and the one is true
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at exactly the same possible worlds as the other. "P is true" is not a
roundabout way of saying "(P=Q)=Q is true," so asserting the one
proposition is not effectively the same as asserting the other, but the one
does have exactly the same truth-table as the other, the one is in exactly
the same maximal consistent sets of propositions as the other and the
one is true in all the same possible worlds as the other. And so on.
Now, by the contradiction and biconditional problems given above, a
tautological equivalence principle is incompatible with the negation and
pure conjunction principles. A reassertion principle might not be incompatible with these principles. But, since a de re equivalence principle
implies a de dicto principle, which in turn implies a tautological principle, those equivalence principles would also come into conflict with the
negation and pure conjunction principles. The equivalence between "It
was true during t that X would do A during t'" and "The world existed
at t and X will do A at t'" may well be a matter of reassertion. So an
Ockhamist on the question of logical fatalism might be able to get along
using the reassertion principle only. But the equivalence between "God
believed that X would do A during t'" and "God existed at t and X will
do A at t'" is a de re equivalence based on the essence of the individual
named God. So, it seems to me that no Ockhamist on the foreknowledge
problem can escape the inconsistency noted above by shifting to the
reassertion principle.
Furthermore, saying that God believed during t that X would do A
during t' just does not seem to be a roundabout way of saying that God
existed during t and X would do A during t'. The former is about God's
mental state. The latter is about God's existence and X's action-the
fusion of those two facts, one in the past and one in the future. The
reassertion principle does not apply. So I have no reason to say that the
former is not strictly about t even though the latter is not strictly about t.
So versions of Ockhamism such as the one Plantinga endorses, do not
provide a way of reconciling foreknowledge and human freedom. This
in spite of the fact that, in the main, that is what Ockhamists like
Plantinga try to do. But when based on the reassertion principle instead
of the equivalence principle, Plantinga-style Ockhamism at least gives
one a nice way of handling logical fatalism.
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